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Abstract
Internationally, there is wide cross-country heterogeneity in government responses
to dual practice in the health sector. This paper provides a uniform theoretical
framework to analyze and compare some of the most common regulations. We fo-
cus on three interventions: banning dual practice, oﬀering rewarding contracts to
public physicians, and limiting dual practice (including both limits to private earn-
ings of dual providers and limits to involvement in private activities). An ancillary
objective of the paper is to investigate whether regulations that are optimal for
developed countries are adequate for developing countries as well. Our results oﬀer
theoretical support for the desirability of diﬀerent regulations in diﬀerent economic
environments.
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In many developed and developing countries it is common practice for physicians to work
simultaneously in public hospitals and private facilities. Most health economists agree
that this dual practice has both positive and negative side-eﬀects on the delivery of health
services. They argue that, on the one hand, allowing dual practice can serve to reduce
waiting times for treatment and lead to improvements in access to health services. But,
on the other hand, dual providers may have incentives to skimp on work hours or divert
patients to private clinics where they have some ﬁnancial interest, negatively impacting
service provision in the public sector.1 On the whole, there is no consensus on the net
eﬀects of dual practice in the health sector and there is no unique and simple answer as
to whether and how this practice should be regulated.
This lack of consensus is reﬂected by the fact that there is wide cross-country het-
erogeneity in government responses to dual practice.2 While some governments ban it
altogether,3 others regulate or restrict dual practice with diﬀerent regulatory instruments.
The measures implemented include oﬀering higher salaries or other work beneﬁts to physi-
cians in exchange for their working exclusively in the public sector,4 limiting the income
physicians can earn through dual practice,5 and limiting dual practice through govern-
ment speciﬁcation of the maximum involvement in private activities.6 In addition, most
of these regulations have been implemented only in developed countries, while in devel-
1See Eggleston and Bir (2006) for a thorough discussion on these issues.
2See García-Prado and González (2007) for a review of these policies.
3China (Jingqing, 2006) and Canada (Flood and Archibaldare, 2001) are examples of countries where
physician dual practice is forbidden.
4The governments of Spain, Portugal and Italy, among others, have oﬀered public physicians exclusive
contracts that aim to ensure that signatories do not engage in private practice in exchange for salary
supplementation or promotions.
5The restriction of private earnings of publicly employed physicians has been implemented in the UK
a n di nF r a n c e .I nt h eU K ,f u l l - t i m eN H Sc o n s u l t a n t s ,w ho are mostly senior specialists, are permitted to
earn up to 10% of their gross income from private practice in addition to their NHS earnings. Those NHS
doctors who work under a maximum part-time contract are allowed to practice privately without earning
restrictions by giving up one eleventh of their NHS salary (European Observato r yo nH e a l t hS y s t e m s ,
2004). Similarly, in France, public hospitals employ both full-time and part-time physicians who can
also provide private services subject to the restriction that income from private fees is limited to 30% of
physician total income (Rickman and McGuire, 1999).
6In Austria, Ireland and Italy physicians are encouraged to perform private services within government
hospitals and the share of beds allocated to privately insured patients is legally deﬁned. In Austria the
share of beds allocated to privately insured patients must not exceed 25% of total beds (Stepan and
Sommersguter-Reichmann, 2005). In Italy public hospitals are required to reserve between 6% and 12%
of their beds for private patients (France, Taroni and Donatini, 2005). Similarly, in Ireland, 20% of beds








 oping countries dual practice remains largely unregulated, although it is attracting more
attention from policy makers.
In this paper we provide a theoretical model to study diﬀerent governmental responses
to dual practice. The aim of the paper is two-fold. First, we analyze from a theoretical
point of view diﬀerent regulations that are currently employed to deal with dual practice.
Secondly, we investigate whether the regulatory policies that are optimal for developed
countries are adequate for developing countries as well, or whether a diﬀerent policy mix
is needed. As discussed below, there are no existing works in the literature that provide
a uniform theoretical framework to evaluate the desirability of one or another regulation
on dual practice. We believe our results shed new light on the answers to these questions.
We construct a simple model in which a Health Authority contracts physicians in order
to provide public health care and designs the regulatory regime regarding dual practice.
Physicians have diﬀerent levels of ability, interpreted as their capacity to provide adequate
health services to patients, and they can choose, given the regulatory regime and available
contracts, whether to work solely for the public sector, as dual practitioners, or exclusively
in the private sector. In our model the public/private interaction is two-fold. On the one
hand, private practice might aﬀect the performance of a physician in the public sector.
On the other hand, if the private market recognizes and rewards ability it becomes costly
for the Health Authority to retain highly skilled physicians within the public sector.
We analyze regulations that deal with dual practice using two diﬀerent health produc-
tion functions in the public sector so as to illustrate various situations in diﬀerent coun-
tries. First, we consider an environment where the production of health within the public
sector depends mostly on the overall number of public physicians and not so much on
their individual characteristics. We identify this situation with developed countries where
the availability of advanced medical technology, existence of standardized treatment pro-
tocols and adherence to practice guidelines substantially reduces physician discretion. We
also consider a health production function for which the personal characteristics of each
physician play an important role in the provision of health care, a scenario that we believe
more closely resembles what happens in less developed economies.
We focus on three kinds of interventions: banning dual practice, oﬀering rewarding
contracts to public physicians, and limiting dual practice, including both earnings limita-
tions and limits to involvement in private activities.
Our model yields some interesting implications concerning regulation. First, if a policy
of limiting dual practice is to be enforced, limiting physicians’ earnings from dual practice
is always worse than limiting their involvement. The reason is that a policy that constrains
private income has a milder eﬀect on the amount of dual practice performed, and therefore








 activities in order to satisfy their earning constraint. In contrast, a policy that limits
involvement in private activities directly targets the intensity of dual practice and is
t h e r e f o r em o r ee ﬀective in curbing losses in productivity.
While the above recommendation is general, our analysis suggests that in many re-
spects optimal policies diﬀer for developed and less developed economies. In developed
countries the choice of regulatory intervention depends solely on the cost of the dual
practice. For small costs no intervention is required, while for large costs the best in-
tervention is to impose a limit on physician involvement in dual practice. Interestingly,
we ﬁnd that banning dual practice, even if it is enforceable, is never desirable. Even if
dual practice imposes a signiﬁcant burden on the public production of health, the Health
Authority can alleviate these costs as dual practice reduces the salary needed to retain
doctors working at public facilities. Finally, oﬀering exclusive contracts to physicians who
volunteer to work exclusively in the public sector is optimal only if a limiting policy faces
enforceability problems.
In developing countries the results diﬀer sharply, as it is the attractiveness of the
private sector that determines the need for regulation. If the attractiveness of the private
sector is high, then the government should never intervene, regardless of the cost of dual
practice. In this case, restricting dual practice pushes highly skilled physicians into the
private sector, and the Health Authority of a developing country cannot aﬀord to lose
its most able professionals. When the private sector is unattractive, however, the risk
of losing physicians is low, and the best policy is either to ban dual practice (if the cost
associated with dual practice is high) or leave it alone (if the cost is low). Limiting policies
in developing countries emerge as the optimal instrument only for situations in which the
private sector is moderately attractive, i.e. not so low as to make banning feasible, and
n o ts oh i g ha st od r a was i g n i ﬁcant number of physicians away from the public sector.
Exclusive contracts are never optimal in developing countries. The reason is that the
physicians who accept the premium and become public-only providers tend to be the
less productive. Given the importance that doctors’ individual characteristics have for
the production of public health in developing countries, paying such a premium is not
worthwhile.
The theoretical literature on physician dual practice in mixed health care markets is
not abundant.7 There has been some research on physicians’ incentives as dual providers.
7There are other papers in the health economics literature that have examined the interaction between
public and private health care provision, but they do not consider job incentives of physicians working
in both sectors. These include Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2002), which analyzes the eﬀect of diﬀerent
reimbursement rules on quality and cost eﬃciency; Iversen (1997), which considers the eﬀect of private
health care provision on waiting lists in the public sector; Jofre-Bonet (2000), which studies the interaction








 Rickman and McGuire (1999) concentrate on the implications of the fact that a doctor
can oﬀer both public and private services to the same patient and examine the optimal
public reimbursement for doctors who are dual providers. Barros and Olivella (2002) and
González (2005) analyze the physician’s decision to “cream-skim” patients in a context
with waiting lists in the public sector. While González (2005) shows that if doctors are
dual providers, the most proﬁtable patients will be referred to their private practices,
Barros and Olivella (2002) ﬁnd that if public treatment is rationed it is not necessarily
the case that physicians end up treating the mildest cases from the waiting list in their
private practice. Finally, Delfgaauw (2007) considers the implications of diﬀerences in
physician altruism. He shows that allowing for private provision of health care in parallel
to public provision is generally beneﬁcial for patients, but allowing physicians to transfer
patients from the public system to their private practices reduces these beneﬁts, as it
harms the poorest patients.
There are very few works that focus on the regulations that deal with dual practice.
González (2004) presents a model in which a physician has an incentive to provide ex-
cessive quality in the public sector in order to raise prestige. In such a context, limiting
private practice might not be desirable. She also shows that the use of exclusive contracts
can be a valuable regulatory measure when governments cannot design appropriate incen-
tive contracts. Biglaiser and Ma (2007) also study the incentives of moonlighting, which
can lead public-service physicians to refer their patients to their private practices. Using a
model where some doctors are dedicated to the public system and behave honestly while
others are utility maximizers, they show that limiting private practice revenues through
price ceilings reduces the adverse behavioral reactions of public sector physicians and can
improve public service quality. Finally, using a model in which physicians divide their
labour between public and (if allowed) private sectors, Brekke and Sørgard (2007) suggest
that allowing physician dual practice ‘crowds out’ public provision, and results in lower
overall health care provision. Thus, a ban on dual practice can be an eﬃcient policy when
private sector competition is weak and public and private provisions are suﬃciently close
substitutes. All these papers analyze speciﬁc policies in diﬀerent settings. Therefore, to
the best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst work that provides a uniform theoretical frame-
work through which the desirability of diﬀerent regulations that deal with dual practice
can be determined and compared.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 intro-
duces two simple regimes: a laissez-faire scenario where dual practice is allowed without
regulation, and the opposite extreme, where dual practice is forbidden. Section 4 con-
centrates on rewarding policies for physicians that work for the public sector exclusively,








 while Section 5 analyzes limiting policies. Section 6 characterizes the optimal policy mix
for the regulation of dual practice and elaborates on the main policy implications of the
preceding analysis. Finally, the last section oﬀers some concluding remarks. All of the
proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a Health Authority ( hereafter) that aims to provide public health care
but is also concerned about its costs. In order to keep the set-up tractable we abstract
from patients and concentrate on the amount of health generated in the public sector.
The quality (or the level) of publicly provided care depends on which physicians work in
the public system and on whether these physicians are involved in dual practice or not.
We assume that the  designs the rules for performing dual practice and, given the
basic regime (dual practice allowed or not), the physicians choose among the diﬀerent
options available to them. Accordingly our model has two stages, and we solve the game
by backwards induction.
2.1 The physician’s decision
There is a set of physicians with diﬀerent ability  distributed uniformly on the interval
[0¯ ].8 The total amount of physicians has mass ¯ . Physicians can work solely in the
public sector, work for the private sector or or work in both sectors as dual providers. If
they work for the public sector they receive the wage  I na d d i t i o nt ot h ew a g ef r o m
the public sector , a physician who is involved in dual practice receives proﬁts from this
practice. These proﬁts are equal to a revenue (Π ()) that depends on the physician
ability, ,a n do nt h ea m o u n to fd u a lp r a c t i c eh ep e r f o r m s ,m e a s u r e db y ≥ 0 We assume
Π () is increasing in  and  and concave in 
When involved in dual practice, and in cases where the  does not impose any
restriction, the physician chooses the intensity of his dual practice  in order to maximize
his proﬁt s .I fw ed e n o t eb y∗ () the optimal involvement in dual practice then Π () ≡
Π (∗ ())
Finally, the physician can choose to practice solely in the private sector. In this case
he receives the revenue Π() ≥ 0 We assume that () ≡ Π()−Π ()  0 i.e.,
the amount of private proﬁts earned by a physician who is a dual practitioner is always
strictly smaller than that attained by leaving the public sector altogether.
8Note that denoting the lowest ability by  =0is only a normalization. In our model, all doctors

















Now we can study the physician’s decision as a function of his ability and the wage
oﬀered in the public sector. In what follows, we will assume particular functional forms
but our ﬁrst result can be easily stated in general:
Lemma 1 For a given salary , the optimal decision of a physician, as a function of his
ability  is as follows:










he chooses to work only in the private sector,
with ˜  = −1 ()










he chooses to work only in the private sector,
with ˜  =
¡
Π¢−1 ()
Lemma 1 presents the optimal strategy for physicians allocating time to the diﬀerent
t y p e so fp r a c t i c e .T h em o r ea b l eo n e st e n dt ob em o r ei n v o l v e di nt h ep r i v a t es e c t o rs i n c e
their ability allows them to get a higher return. The less able tend to combine both public
and private activities if dual practice is allowed, or work only in public practice when this
is not the case. Note that when dual practice is allowed no physician decides to work
solely in the public sector.9 When dual practice is forbidden, the population of physicians
working for the public sector decreases (since Π()  () it is straightforward that,
for a given  ˜ ()  ˜ ()). In addition, when the public and private sectors do
not share physicians, higher private sector earnings are expected to attract more highly
skilled physicians, leaving those of lesser ability in the public sector.10
9This is due to the fact that we do not consider a ﬁxed cost for engaging in dual practice, and this
assumption makes it proﬁtable for all physicians to be moonlighters. This assumption can be relaxed
without altering the message of the paper, but at the expense of sacriﬁcing expositional clarity.
10We assume the upper bound ¯  is suﬃciently large so as to avoid corner solutions (situations in which








 S i n c ew ew i l li n t r o d u c et h ep h y s i c i a nd e c i s i o ni nam o r ec o m p l e xg a m ea n dw ew a n tt o
compare diﬀerent regulatory regimes, in order to derive explicit results we will henceforth
consider that the proﬁts from dual and private practice are given by the functional forms
Π ()=( − 2)
12 and Π()= respectively. The parameter 0 serves as
a proxy for the attractiveness of the private sector. This parameter may be speciality-
speciﬁc, which allows us to discuss the diﬀerent behaviours of physicians engaged in
primary, secondary, and tertiary care, and in diﬀerent specialities. Parameter  can also
be seen as a measure of the physician’s need for extra revenue or as the ﬁnancial motivation
of the physician.
These functional forms satisfy all the hypotheses we have mentioned above regarding
dual and private practice beneﬁts, and are simple but ﬂexible enough to have interesting
results. For these functional forms, given ability  the optimal physician involvement in
dual practice ∗ () is
∗ ()=
2 for any  ∈ [0¯ ],
which implies that at the optimal level of involvement in dual practice the physician has
proﬁts Π ()=
2 11 These proﬁts illustrate the fact that since more able physicians
can obtain higher income by working in the private sector, they will be more devoted to
dual practice and will succeed in obtaining a higher income as a result (not only because
t h e ya r em o r ei n v o l v e di np r i v a t ea c t i v i t yb u ta l s ob e c a u s et h em a r k e tv a l u e st h e mm o r e ) .
The advantage of using speciﬁc functional forms, especially the ones we are considering,









both increasing in the wage received through public practice and decreasing in the at-
tractiveness of the private sector. More able physicians tend to be more involved, or only
involved, in private practice. Thresholds can also be read in terms of physicians with the
same ability but diﬀerent parameter . If we follow our interpretation of  as speciality-
speciﬁc, the properties of these thresholds are in accordance with some stylized facts since
more doctors will be involved in the private sector as  increases. For example, Gruen et
al. (2002), using data from a survey in Bangladesh, found that primary-care physicians
were willing to give up dual practice in exchange for a higher salary but doctors engaged
in secondary and tertiary care were far more reluctant to do so. This might reﬂect the
higher attractiveness of the private sector for more specialized physicians. An alternative
interpretation would relate the parameter  to the ﬁnancial motivation of the physicians.
In this case, our results suggest that physicians with higher ﬁnancial motivations will be









 more prone to dual practice either because they suﬀer from ﬁnancial constraints or be-
cause public sector salaries are low. This is in accordance with stylized facts that report
that young physicians (whose salary is smaller and often have to pay oﬀ educational loans)
tend to be substantially involved in dual practice. It also accords with the “brain drain,”
i.e. the desire to migrate to countries where physicians’ pay is higher.12
2.2 The Health Authority decision
To deﬁne the ’s objective function, we take the view that the  is only concerned
about the level of heath care provided by the public system. In other words, we assume
that the  does not include the private provision of health in its objective function. We
assume that the performance of a physician in the public sector depends on his ability
a n di sg i v e nb yt h ef u n c t i o n () If the physician is a dual supplier, however, this has an
impact on his public sector performance that will be increasing in the amount of private
practice he performs (). Formally, a dual provider’s performance in the public sector is
given by 1
1+ () where  measures the marginal impact of the dual practice on public
sector performance. Note that this functional form allows for several situations. A loss
associated with dual practice (related, for instance, to the fact that physicians divert time
and attention from hard-to-control tasks or to the emergence of conﬂicts of interest such
as induced demand, etc.) is represented by positive values of .I f  =0public and
private activities are independent. This functional form also accommodates situations in
which complementarities exist between the two sectors, corresponding to a negative  In
what follows, however, our discussion will concentrate on 0 since we are interested in
analyzing situations where the regulator is concerned about the negative implications of
doctors’ involvement in dual practice.13 T h i sw a y ,t h ec o s to fd u a lp r a c t i c ei si n c r e a s i n gi n
 (the marginal impact on performance increases as the physician becomes more involved
in dual practice) and convex.
Let us deﬁne as  ⊂ [0¯ ] the set of all doctors working exclusively for the public
sector, and as  ⊂ [0¯ ] the set of all doctors involved in dual practice. We denote by
|| and || the size (number of physicians) of the sets  and  respectively. Then,












− (|| + ||)
12See, for instance, Mainiero and Woodﬁeld (2008) for an account of the evidence of moonlighting
among radiology residents in the United States, and Mayta-Tristán et al. (2008) for a warning of the risk
of brain drain of physicians in Peru.
13We will brieﬂy discuss the results when 0 in the next section, to illustrate why this case is not of








 The ﬁrst term measures the health provided at public facilities. The last term represents
the wage costs: how many physicians work (exclusively or partially) in the public sector
times the salary. The parameter 0 represents the relative weight of the health
provision as compared to the costs concern. It is easy to see that  and () always go
together. We have chosen to keep both variables in the model so as to discuss more easily
cases where the  has a higher concern about health care provision and cases where
the  has access to more productive health care technology.
The  decides on the wage  which indirectly determines the physician’s decision
to allocate services. Note that, without loss of generality, we assume that the  does
not introduce any constraint on the number of physicians that will be hired in the public
sector since when it is interested in reducing participation it is suﬃcient to reduce the
wage, which allows it to save costs.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this model can be used to understand how the
implications of dual practice might diﬀer for developing and more developed countries,
and also to assess how the relative merits of diﬀe r e n tr e g u l a t i o n sd e p e n do nt h et y p eo f
economy. For this purpose, we consider two alternative technologies  () for the pro-
duction of health in the public sector. Developed countries beneﬁt from widespread use
of advanced technologies and test-based diagnoses, as well as rigorous training processes,
standardized treatments and protocols, and strict adherence to practice guidelines. More-
over, the large size of public facilities facilitates the referral of patients to specialists and
the formation of teams of physicians who share information and discuss especially diﬃcult
cases. All these features point towards a lower degree of physician discretion and hence
reduced impact of individual physician characteristics on the quality of care delivered at
public facilities. We model this by assuming a health production technology of the form
 ()= In contrast, in developing countries the lower degree of specialization among
physicians, their obligation to cope with illnesses outside their area of expertise, the lack
of infrastructures and modern technologies that support diagnosis, and the lack of formal-
ized medical protocols all make the actual quality of care more dependent on individual
physician characteristics. For this reason, we consider a health production technology of
the form  ()=.14
Now we have all the tools to study the impact of diﬀerent policy options to regulate
dual practice. We observe wide variations in how governments tackle the issue of dual
practice. While some governments fully prohibit this practice, others regulate or restrict
dual job holding with diﬀerent intensities and regulatory instruments. In the following
14Similar arguments often appear when comparing urban and rural practitioners. For instance, Ra-
binowitz and Paynter (2002) higlights that rural physicians retain more clinical independence in their









 sections we analyze several policies currently in force in some health care systems. We,
ﬁrst, consider only the choice allowing versus prohibiting dual practice. We then study
more sophisticated regulations such as the desirability of allowing dual practice while
oﬀering work beneﬁts to physicians in exchange for their working exclusively in the public
sector, limiting the income physicians can earn through dual job holding, and limiting the
degree of involvement of public physicians in private activities.
3 Laissez-faire versus Banning
The ﬁrst possible policy option is to ban dual practice altogether. If this is the only
intervention available, the alternatives of the are either to let physicians freely decide
whether and how to be dual providers or to forbid dual practice and let physicians choose
only between public or private provision.















If there is a ban on dual practice, and assuming that this policy is enforced, the problem











We focus ﬁrst on developed countries. In this case, after computing the optimal wages
in both regimes and comparing their associated ’s welfare, we conclude:
Proposition 1 In developed economies, if the  can only ban dual practice, there






such that the best intervention is as follows,













The results in Proposition 1 are predictable and, using Lemma 1, imply (respectively)
the cut-oﬀs





















 From Proposition 1, it is easy to check that for any combination of parameters   
This implies that dual practice might be desirable because it allows the  to reduce the
wage needed to retain physicians working in the public sector. This is in agreement with
one of the traditional arguments in the literature in favor of allowing multiple job holdings,
namely that the cost of attracting a worker is smaller when the primary job oﬀers a wage
and the possibility of extra income via dual practice (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).
However we also have to take into account the potential costs of dual practice, and we
conclude that when this cost is suﬃciently high ( large), it does not pay to allow dual
practice. Hence, for those specialities where (other things equal) the loss is high the 
will decide to ban dual practice.
The complete analysis of the comparative statics of the results in Proposition 1 is
presented in Table 1, which summarizes the sign of the derivatives of ( )a n d











Table 1: Comparative statics  ()=
As one might expect, if the  puts increased weight on public health provision (higher
), or health production technology becomes more eﬃcient (higher ), then a higher
salary will be paid to public physicians and, hence, a larger number of practitioners will
work for the public sector. Conversely, a larger cost of dual practice (higher )r e s u l t si n
smaller wages and less physicians hired in the public sector when dual practice is allowed.
It is also interesting to note that  has no eﬀect on the salary paid in the public sector; it
only aﬀects the size of the population of physicians attracted to the public health system.
T h ef a c tt h a t does not aﬀect the salary in developed countries, where the public health
production function is  ()= is related to the fact that in this scenario the marginal
revenue required to keep one more doctor in the public health system and the marginal
cost of doing so are both linear in 1
 and hence  does not aﬀect the optimal wage. Thus,
changes in  only aﬀect the number of physicians that are hired.
Note that the results presented in Proposition 1 are also valid (and well-deﬁned) for
negative values of  (as long as − 1
2). For  ≤ 0, the laissez-faire regime is always
superior.15 Since this superiority result is maintained throughout the paper, we will not








 discuss it further. The remaining analysis focuses on the case 0.
Let us now turn to the case of developing countries:
Proposition 2 In developing economies, when the  can only ban dual practice,
the best intervention is as follows,
i) If   then the public sector is unsustainable for every value of 










iii) If  ≤

2  then there exists a threshold ¯ 2  0 such that,






b) If ¯ 2 ban dual practice and set a wage level

 =¯ 
The results for  ≤

2 imply (using Lemma 1) that the cut-oﬀsw h e nd u a lp r a c t i c ei s
allowed and forbidden are respectively






 ≡ ˜ 
(
)=¯ 
We see how in developing economies the attractiveness of the private sector ()p l a y s
a key role. Only when the private sector is relatively unattractive does the  ﬁnd it
optimal to ban dual practice. Otherwise the best it can do is to cope with its negative
implications. The reason is that a high  implies that banning dual practice will encourage
physicians to leave the public sector. Thus, the public health sector will suﬀer from a
severe brain drain of the most able physicians.16 Since the capacity of the public sector
to produce health is directly linked to the ability of the public physicians, losing the most
able professionals is something the  cannot aﬀord. Note that in the case where for a
wage,  =

2 in both regimes. Since by allowing dual practice the  is able to attract more doctors,
and hence to provide more health, regulation will never be in the ’s interest.
16There is evidence that bans on dual practice in developing countries lead to a signiﬁcant drain of
physicians from public to private practice as well as a migration of physicians to other countries with
better work conditions. See Globerman and Vining (1998) and Peters et al. (2002) for experiences in








 given speciality the private sector is extremely attractive, it will not be optimal for the 
even to maintain that specialty in the public sector. The minimum wage that a physician
would require () in that case would exceed the marginal value of his contribution to
the public sector ().17 If one accepts that  m a yd e p e n do nt h el e v e lo fh e a l t hc a r e
provision, the previous result indicates that in developing economies it might be optimal
in some cases to provide only primary health care in the public sector.
Further analysis of the comparative statics for the production technology deﬁned by
 ()=, yields the eﬀects summarized in Table 2. Again, as the weight placed by
the  on public health provision increases (higher ), health production technology
becomes more eﬃcient (higher ), or the cost of dual practice goes down (lower ), then
salaries in the public sector rise, and an increasing number of practitioners work for the











Table 2: Comparative statics  ()=
As we have already observed, the attractiveness of the private sector () reduces the
number of physicians involved in public provision. Also, a more attractive private sector
reduces the wage paid in the public sector if dual practice is allowed; wages increase only
if dual practice is banned (i.e., when the public sector decides to hire all physicians).
4 Rewarding Policies
Let us now consider the policy of paying (on top of a salary )ap r e m i u m∆ to physicians
who decide to work exclusively for the public sector.19 In this section we investigate the
conditions under which this kind of policy, which is currently implemented in several
health systems (e.g. those of Spain, Portugal, and Italy), can be an optimal regulatory
tool.
17In what follows, we disregard the case where the  is confronted with a high  for all types of
health care (implying that no physician would work in the public sector). Therefore, we assume   
18Under the Banning regime,  and  do not depend on  and  but notice that these parameters
aﬀect the threshold separating the diﬀerent regions in Proposition 2.



















Now we can study the physician’s decision as a function of his ability and the contracts
oﬀered in the public sector. Without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to
situations where ∆ ≥ 0 because if the premium is zero then we have the case in which no
doctor is working exclusively in the public sector.
Lemma 2 Given (∆), when dual practice is not restricted, the optimal decision of
a physician as a function of his ability  is as follows












he chooses to work only in the private sector



















he chooses to work only in the private sector
Lemma 2 presents the optimal strategy for physician allocating time to diﬀerent types
of practice when exclusive contracts are enforced. The more skilled physicians tend to be
more involved in the private sector as their ability allows them to have a higher return.
The less skilled tend to be fully involved in public practice. It can be seen that by setting
∆ the  can induce a situation in which no physician chooses to be a dual provider
(∆  ).20 Note also that if ∆ =0(there is no extra wage for exclusivity in the public
sector) then a physician will never work exclusively in the public sector. As  -which
summarizes the proﬁtability of private practice- increases, more physicians tend to be
involved in dual practice.
We wish to highlight that this regulatory environment is suﬃciently rich so as to
encompass the laissez-faire and banning regimes examined in the previous section, as the
following remark shows.
20The fact that the bonus can exceed the baseline wage is a feature of the model, but the fact that it












that generates the same outcome.
Remark 1 ensures that any outcome that could be achieved in the previous section can
be replicated within this richer context. What needs further analysis are the conditions
under which it actually pays for the  to oﬀer a real exclusive contract that induces
some physicians to work solely in the public sector. As the following proposition shows
t h i sd e p e n d sc r u c i a l l yo nt h et y p eo fh e a l t hc a r es y s t e m .
Proposition 3 In developed economies, when the  can oﬀer an exclusive contract
the best intervention is,
i) If  ≤ 2























iii) If  4





We see how, in developed economies, whether it pays or not to allow dual practice
depends on its costs. If  is low, it does not pay to try to reduce the incentives of
the physicians to work as dual suppliers. Exclusivity premiums are not paid and all
physicians working in the public sector are dual providers. As  increases, it is more
and more proﬁtable to pay an exclusivity premium in order to deter some physicians
from being dual providers. In that case, some physicians decide to work exclusively in
the public sector, some are dual providers and the remaining work solely in the private
sector. Finally, if  is suﬃciently high, then it is in the ’s interest to pay a premium
so high that it deters all physicians from dual practice (which is equivalent to banning
dual practice).
If we compare these results with those in Proposition 1, we see how exclusive contracts
oﬀer greater ﬂexibility for the to mitigate the loss of productivity associated with dual
practice. Using Proposition 1 we can conclude that in developed economies the threshold








 strictly lower in the laissez-faire scenario (¯ 1) than when exclusive contracts are available
( 4
). This makes the  less interested in banning dual practice when such rewarding
policies are available.
However, as we now detail, the results for developing countries contrasts sharply with
those just described.
Proposition 4 In developing economies the  never ﬁnds it optimal to oﬀer an ex-
clusive contract to physicians. Instead, the decision is between no regulation and banning
dual practice altogether, as characterized in Proposition 2.
In developing countries a rewarding policy such as an exclusivity premium intended to
induce some physicians to work solely in the public sector is never an optimal intervention.
The reason is that such a policy would attract only the less able physicians (those with
lower prospects of private earnings). This also happens in developed economies, but the
characteristics of the health care systems in developing countries make the provision of
care much more dependent on physician ability. For this reason, it never pays to oﬀer an
extra premium as it only attracts those physicians with the smallest capacity to contribute
to health care production.
5 Limiting Policies
In this section we consider scenarios in which the restricts dual practice. This is mod-
elled as a constraint ﬁxed by the  that limits physician involvement in dual practice.
We consider two possible restrictions: in the ﬁrst, physician involvement in the private
sector is subject to a maximum of ¯  ≥ 0; in the second one, the earnings of the public
physician in his private practice are limited to a maximum amount ¯ Π Then, given these
cut-oﬀs( ¯  or ¯ Π), physicians choose their level of involvement .
First we characterize physician behaviour when the option to engage in dual practice
is subject to limitation. We consider the two possible limitations, one after the other.
Focusing on involvement constraints we ﬁnd:
Lemma 3 When there is a policy that limits to ¯  the maximum involvement in dual
practice, the physician’s amount of dual practice is
∗ ()=¯  if  ≥
2¯ 
  and then  =  +(¯  (− ¯ ))
12
∗ ()=
2 if  ≤
2¯ 
  and then  =  + 
2 





















the physician chooses to work only in the private sector.


























the physician chooses to work only in the private sector.
The second limiting policy constrains the revenue that the physician can obtain from
h i sd u a lp r a c t i c et oam a x i m u mo f¯ Π.I nt h i sc a s e ,g i v e nt h ec u t - o ﬀ ¯ Π, the physician
may choose any level of dual practice  provided the private revenues are such that
(− 2)
12 ≤ ¯ Π
Lemma 4 When there is a policy that limits to ¯ Π the maximum private earnings ob-
tained in dual practice, the physician’s amount of dual practice is
∗ ()=ˆ  ( ¯ )  
2 if  ≥ 2¯ Π
  and then  =  + ¯ Π
∗ ()=
2 if  ≤ 2¯ Π
  and then  =  + 
2 
Accordingly, with this, given
¡¯ Π
¢
the physician’s optimal choice is:













the physician chooses to work only in the private sector.











  +¯ Π

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the physician chooses to work only in the private sector.
When earnings limitations are eﬀective, dual practice depends (in a negative way)




This means that the more able physicians, as well as those working in more proﬁtable
specialties, are constrained to be less involved in private practice if they work at all
for the public sector. In other words, all the physicians above a certain level of ability
or proﬁtability will have the same utility. Hence, more able doctors in more proﬁtable
disciplines will be more tempted to work exclusively for the private sector.








 Proposition 5 Both for developing and developed economies,ap o l i c yo fl i m i t i n g
involvement in private practice always dominates a policy of limiting earnings from
dual practice.
T h ei n t u i t i o nf o rt h i sr e s u l th a st od ow i t hh o wt h et w op o l i c i e sa ﬀect diﬀerent types
of physicians. Overall, proﬁt limitations have a milder eﬀect on the amount of dual
practice performed by physicians. Under a policy that limits proﬁts to ¯ Π,t h em o r ea b l e
physicians, those with 2¯ Π
  will be forced to allocate signiﬁcantly less time to private
practice in order to satisfy their earning constraint. Meanwhile dual-practicing physicians
with a relatively low ability are not constrained by this policy because even if they engage
in a high amount of dual practice their earnings are relatively low. In contrast, policies
that limit involvement directly target the intensity of dual practice and are therefore more
eﬀective in limiting its costs.
The proof in the Appendix shows that for any possible policy
¡¯ Π
¢
it is possible to
construct a policy of the form (¯ ) that incurs the same costs (i.e., pays the same wages
and hires the same amount of physicians) while inducing a lower amount of dual practice
(thus reducing losses of productivity). It is important to highlight that the dominance of
involvement limits over income limits is fairly general: it does not depend on the particular
characteristics of the health care system under consideration and therefore applies to both
developing and more developed economies.21
Once we have shown that a policy that limits involvement in private practice is al-
ways preferable to one that limits physician earnings, the next step is to characterize the
shape of the optimal limiting policy for the two alternative health care systems under
consideration.
From Lemma 3 we see that if the limit is too soft (¯  ≥ ), then the policy is ineﬀective
as the maximum-involvement constraint is not binding for any of the physicians that
actually work for the public sector. In this case, we are trivially back to the laissez-faire
scenario.
T h em o r ei n t e r e s t i n gc a s ei sw h e n¯  and the policy actually aﬀects physician

























2 +¯  +
p




subject to the constraints that  ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ ¯  ≤ 
As before, the characteristics of the health care system determine the results. Let us
ﬁrst consider a developed economy,
21In fact this result can be extended to a more general model without the need to resort to particular








 Proposition 6 In developed economies, when the can limit physician involvement
in private practice,
• It is never optimal to fully ban dual practice, i.e., ¯  =0is never a solution.
• If  2
 the best the  can do is not to limit dual practice.
• If  2
 there exists an optimal limit to the amount of dual practice.
Two main insights emerge from this proposition. First, no matter how large the cost
of dual practice, it is never in the best interest of the  to ban it. The policy to limit
dual practice is suﬃciently rich so as to cope with diﬀerent degrees of productivity loss.
Secondly, there are values of the productivity loss ( 2
)f o rw h i c hi ti si nt h eb e s t
interest of the  not to limit dual practice at all. The reason is that any limiting policy
will reduce the proﬁtability of dual practice and thus incline physicians towards working
exclusively in the private sector. If the  wants to keep those workers in the public
sector it has to compensate them by paying a higher salary. For this reason, only when
t h ec o s to fd u a lp r a c t i c ei ss u ﬃciently large does the  ﬁnd it proﬁtable to incur the
extra cost (higher wages) of imposing a limit on dual practice. In the proof of this result
it is also clear that the decision to restrict dual practice does not depend on  although
 will aﬀect the number of physicians eventually hired in the public sector.
Now let us consider developing countries, for which the results are substantially dif-
ferent.
Proposition 7 In developing economies, when the  can limit physician involve-
ment in private practice
• For high values of  the best the  can do is not to limit dual practice.
• There exist intermediate values of  for which there is an optimal limit to the in-
volvement in private practice.
• For low values of  the best the  can do is either to ban dual practice (if  is
high) or not to limit dual practice at all (if  is low).
The results for developing economies sharply diﬀer from those in the previous scenario.
The attractiveness of the private sector (measured by )t u r n so u tt ob et h ek e yv a r i a b l e
when characterizing the optimal policy. When the private alternative is very attractive,
the establishment of limits to dual practice is never optimal. In this case, setting a
limiting policy would make it very expensive to keep highly skilled physicians and the








 developing countries, would severely undermine the ’s capacity to provide health.
When the private sector is relatively unattractive a limiting policy is also not optimal,
for the opposite reason: in this case, because it is relatively cheap to retain physicians
at public facilities, when the cost of dual practice is large enough the  is better oﬀ
banning rather than limiting dual practice. Thus banning dual practice can emerge in
developing economies as the best intervention. Limits are optimal in developing countries
only when the attractiveness of the private sector is moderate. The reason is two-fold.
On the one hand, setting limits can help to reduce the loss of eﬃciency associated with
dual practice without the risk of brain-drain, i.e. losing high-ability physicians to the
private sector. But, on the other hand, keeping physicians in the public sector is not
cheap enough to justify banning dual practice altogether.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 7, as the value of  increases, the limit imposed
by the  on dual practice will be more stringent in order to mitigate its negative
consequences.
6 The Optimal Policy-Mix to Regulate Dual Practice
In this section we combine previous results to present a comprehensive picture of the
policy options available to the  for the regulation of dual practice, and we oﬀer some
policy implications that can be extracted from the analysis.
6.1 The Health Authority’s Choice
F i r s tw ep r o v i d ea no v e r v i e wo ft h ed i ﬀerent policy options for both developing and
developed economies. Combining the propositions discussed in previous sections we obtain
the following result:
Proposition 8 The optimal decision of the  is
• In developed economies,
— If  ≤ 2
 not to regulate dual practice.
— If  2
 to impose a limit (but never a ban) on the physician involvement in
dual practice.
• In developing economies the results in Proposition 7 directly apply.
In developed countries we have shown that it suﬃces to concentrate on the decision








 (whose extreme cases are analyzed in Section 3 Laissez-Faire and Banning) also dominates
exclusive contracts. Thus in developed countries it follows that the choice of optimal in-
tervention depends on the cost of the dual practice. When this cost is low, the best policy
is to leave dual practice unregulated. When the cost of dual practice is suﬃciently severe,
the best policy is to limit physicians’ capacity to engage in dual practice. While the inten-
sity of the productivity losses caused by dual practice will determine the stringency of this
limit, banning dual practice is never worthwhile. An important insight that emerges from
this comparison is the suboptimality of rewarding policies as a way to handle the negative
consequences of dual practice. Although Proposition 3 states that for intermediate values






 exclusive contracts are preferable to the extremes of laissez-faire and
banning, for these values of  it is even better to limit physicians’ capacity to engage in
dual practice.
For developing countries the comparison of the diﬀerent regulatory policies is easier,
as exclusive contracts are never optimal. Hence the optimal policy coincides with the
results stated in Proposition 7. Accordingly, for these countries, policy recommendations
for dealing with dual practice are quite diﬀerent. In developing economies, the most im-
portant variable for determining the best policy mix turns out to be the attractiveness of
the private sector. If the private sector is very attractive (i.e.,  is high) then regardless
of the cost of dual practice the  should not impose any regulation. The reason is that
any intervention would trigger a severe brain-drain of the most skilled professionals to the
private sector and, because of the degree to which health provision in such countries de-
pends on individual characteristics of physicians (due to less stringent practice protocols,
etc.), this drain would severely damage the public provision of health care. In reverse,
the same argument can be used to explain why a relatively unattractive private sector
(i.e., suﬃciently low values of ) can result in the optimality of banning dual practice
altogether. The optimality of a limiting policy is conﬁned to intermediate values of  i.e.,
not so low as to make banning aﬀordable, and not so high as to trigger a brain-drain.
6.2 Policy Implications
W en o wd e s c r i b et h em o s ti m p o r t a n tp o l i c yg uidelines that can be extracted from our
work and suggest some possible extensions of the analysis.
The relevance of the private sector attractiveness
One of the key variables for our results is private sector attractiveness (). It seems
clear that in practice this variable presents a wide and probably multi-dimensional het-
erogeneity. Speciﬁcally, we think it is important to consider (i) diﬀerences between devel-








 between primary physicians and specialists).
Regarding the ﬁrst source of heterogeneity, we expect that the value of  will be
high in developing countries where there are substantial wage diﬀerences between public
and private sectors and also between specialities. This fact points not only to a general
tendency for physicians to be inclined toward heavier involvement in private provision,
but also to the risk of brain-drain, i.e. loss of the most highly skilled medical professionals.
This problem is exacerbated when limits are imposed on dual practice as a way to obtain
extra revenue. With regard to this problem, our model predicts that in countries where
the private alternative is very attractive the argument against regulating dual practice
is correspondingly strong: if dual practice is regulated, the recruitment and retention of
highly skilled physicians in the public sector becomes prohibitively expensive.
Turning to developed countries, we ﬁnd that in our model  aﬀects neither the choice
of optimal regulation nor the kind of contract oﬀered, though it does aﬀect the overall
number of physicians working within the public sector. In the case of specialties with a
large private sector attractiveness, the health authority will choose to hire few physicians
and provide a small level of public health. In other words, a high level of  points toward
the crowding out of public provision by increased private provision. This eﬀect is rein-
forced in our set-up by the fact that we have not imposed a lower bound on the amount
of public health that should be guaranteed. Our analysis could be adapted to encompass
circumstances in which there are specialities with large  which are deemed indispensable
for the public sector (such as anesthesiologists, for instance) and, hence, whose level of
production cannot be substantially reduced. In this case, our analysis would suggest that
such essential specialities should receive higher salaries and softer regulations regarding
dual practice.
Enforceability of Policies
Our analysis makes the best-case assumption that policies are enforceable at zero cost,
and hence ignores enforcement issues that can be important to practical policy application.
However, we admit that the implementation of such regulations is seldom an easy task,
especially in developing countries where the institutional and contracting environments
are often weak.22 If enforceability is an issue, then the design of the optimal policy to
regulate dual practice should incorporate this enforcement dimension.
Although we have not included enforceability concerns in our analysis, we can make
a few observations regarding this important issue. First, we speculate that it may be
easier to control earnings than involvement. Perhaps this is why some countries seem
22With regard to this issue, Eggleston and Bir (2006) argue that the social trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts








 compelled to use this regulatory tool despite our ﬁnding that limits on involvement are,
c e t e r i sp a r i b u s ,m o r ee ﬃcient. Secondly, in the same vein, encouraging public physicians
to perform private practice in public facilities may facilitate the monitoring of actual
involvement in dual practice and thus aid in the enforcement of limiting policies. This is
consistent with the pattern of several European countries (Austria, Ireland, Italy, etc.), as
described in the Introduction. Thirdly, regarding rewarding policies, these may be easy
to enforce, or at least easier than any limiting policy. Thus, in more developed countries
we can rationalize the use of exclusive contracts to induce some physicians to give up dual
practice as a second best choice (when other kinds of policies are diﬃcult to enforce).
Finally, it is worth reiterating that our model shows that in developing countries, even
in a best-case scenario where enforcement is not an issue, limiting policies are optimal
only for very few parameter conﬁgurations ( intermediate). If enforceability problems
are introduced, the attractiveness of these policies would be reduced even more.
Budget Constraints
In our model the  maximizes net proﬁts, i.e. the value associated with the pro-
duction of health minus the wages paid to the physicians. The parameter  measures
the importance of public health provision into the government function. Note that there
might be non-essential specialities (such as dermatologists, speech therapists or dieticians,
among others) for which the  may assign a low value of  Our model predicts that in
developing countries if this value is suﬃciently low (in particular, 
), these specialities
should not be included in the coverage of public plans.
The value of  can also be interpreted as the relative importance that revenue has as
compared to wage costs or, in other words, as a budgetary concern. When considered in
this light, we expect that during an economic recession  should be lower due to more
stringent budget constraints. Here our model provides an argument in favour of non-
regulation in both developed and developing countries. Since any regulation makes the
hiring of practitioners more expensive, whenever the budget is tight it is clear that the
best policy is not to control dual practice.
The cost of dual practice
The results in this paper depend on the cost of dual practice in terms of public perfor-
mance. Theoretical analyses on the eﬀects of dual practice on public health provision are
scarce and show that this practice might bring about both positive and negative eﬀects. It
appears, however, that the arguments about the negative consequences of physician dual
practice dominate the literature. In addition, many health care systems around the world








 tice for health systems is an empirical issue. There are no reliable studies that estimate
this cost, which is summarized by  in our model. Still, one would expect the value of 
be higher, due to weaker monitoring, mild self-regulation, etc., in developing countries.
Interestingly, our model shows that while large values of  point to the use of limits in
more developed economies, this is not necessarily the case in developing countries, where
the attractiveness of the private sector is crucial and may point to no intervention as the
best option.
Health production technology
One may reasonably argue that the average productivity of the health care system in
a developing country is lower than that of a developed country (that is why a developed
country has chosen the technology ).23 This diﬀerence suggests a new argument in favour
of limiting dual practice in developed countries while de-regulating it in developing ones.
This argument follows from our ﬁndings that in both economies lower technology implies
less interest on the part of the  to regulate dual practice.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
Dual practice is a complex phenomenon occurring in the public health systems of many
developed and developing countries. In this paper we have considered some of the impor-
tant factors that determine the optimal regulation for this practice and discussed diﬀerent
policy options. We have analyzed the optimal regulation under diﬀerent hypotheses con-
cerning the public health production function (as a way of describing the situations of
diﬀerent countries) and various policy instruments. The desirability of these instruments
depends on the government ability to control physician dual practice but, more impor-
tantly, on the speciﬁc characteristics of the health sector in question.
In a very simple set-up our analysis has provided several interesting insights regard-
ing the optimal regulation of dual practice. First, we have found that forbidding dual
practice is seldom optimal, as it usually expels valuable professionals–indeed, the most
valuable, if the private market rewards quality–from the public system. In this sense,
dual practice can serve to the budgetary expenses needed to retain high-skilled physicians
working in public facilities. Secondly, focusing on limiting policies, we have shown that
limiting income is always less eﬀective than limiting involvement. The reason is that the
former policy has a milder eﬀect on the amount of dual practice performed, as it only
aﬀects the high skilled physicians that are compelled to reduce private involvement in
order to satisfy their earning constraint. Finally, our analysis has suggested that policy










 recommendations are diﬀerent for more developed and developing economies, thus oﬀer-
ing theoretical support for the desirability of diﬀerent regulations in diﬀerent economic
environments. In developed countries the key factor is the potential negative eﬀect of dual
practice on public performance: when this eﬀect is low the best option is not to intervene;
when it is suﬃciently high the best option is to impose a limit on physician involvement.
Rewarding policies, i.e. those that pay an extra amount to physicians who give up their
private practice, are only desirable when limitations are diﬃcult to enforce. For devel-
oping countries, the design of the optimal policy is more complex as it also depends on
the attractiveness of the private sector. When this attractiveness is very high the best
o p t i o ni sn o tt oi n t e r v e n ea n dt h e r e b ya v o i da ne x o d u so fh i g h l ys k i l l e dp h y s i c i a n sf r o m
the public sector. When it takes an intermediate value, then limits on the involvement
are desirable. Finally, if the potential gains from private practice are low, the optimal
intervention is either to ban dual practice (if the associated costs are high) or not to in-
tervene (if such costs are low). Rewarding contracts are never optimal in these countries
as those physicians that would accept them are the ones with the smallest capacity to
contribute to the production of health.
Certainly, more theoretical and empirical work in this line of research is needed. Still,
we believe that this work can inform the discussion of dual practice and contribute to the
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A.1 Proof of Lemma 1.
From the physician’s utility under the diﬀerent choices  = ;  =  + Π ();
 = Π() it is easy to conclude that no one decides to work only for the public sector
if dual practice is allowed, and the physician ability that determines to go exclusively to
private practice is the one presented in the lemma. ¥
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1.
The  has to solve two independent optimization problems. First, if there is no regu-






















Moreover, it can be checked that the objective function is concave and, hence, that























The Envelope Theorem ensures that W ¡
¢
is decreasing in  If we evaluate in the











































 Moreover, it can be checked that the objective function is concave and, hence, that















 it follows directly
that there exists a threshold ¯ 1  0 such that:




and, hence, the optimal decision is to allow dual
practice.




and, hence, the optimal decision is to ban dual
practice.




































































































For completeness, we can show that ¯ 1 is close to 3



























 A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.
The  has to solve two independent optimization problems. First, if there is no regu-


























 if  
0 if  ≥ 
Moreover, it can be checked that, for the interior solution, the objective function is concave





















The Envelope Theorem ensures that W ¡
¢
is decreasing in  If we evaluate in the


























subject to the constraint that  ≥ 0 This objective function is monotone in  Hence,
the solution is always on the boundaries of the support. Either  =0  or  is such
that ˜  =¯  ( =¯ ). Evaluating the objective function in these two candidates we
have
 =0= ⇒ W =0
 =¯  =⇒ W =¯ 2 ¡
2 − 
¢ (7)






































• If  ≤

2 then, there exists a threshold ¯ 2  0 such that,








This completes the proof. ¥
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2.
From the physician’s utility under the diﬀerent choices   and  we obtain the
results presented in the lemma. ¥
A.5 Proof of Remark 1.
To replicate the laissez-faire scenario it suﬃces to set ∆ =0and  =  To replicate
the situation when dual practice is banned, simply set  =0and ∆ =  Then, all
the results in Propositions 1 and 2 follow directly. ¥
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3.
We need to distinguish two cases depending on whether ∆   or ∆ ≤  If we are in
t h ec a s ew i t h∆   then no physician works as dual provider. In this case, trivially,
the best contract is the optimal banning contract (as deﬁn e di nL e m m a1 ) .T h e r e f o r e ,i n














We need to focus, therefore, on the case with ∆ ≤  The objective function of the






































subject to the constraints,  ≥ 0 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 






































 From here it follows that  =
√
1+2−1
2  0 (the s.o.c. is trivially fulﬁlled). Regard-
ing ∆ there are two candidates that verify the f.o.c. First, ∆∗ =0that fulﬁlls the s.o.c.
provided  ≤ 2
 Secondly, ∆∗ =
−2




2 we also have to check the constraint ∆∗ ≤ ∗:
∆
∗ ≤ 



















0 if  ≤ 2

It only rests to evaluate the ’s objective function in the solution of this case and
compare it with W ¡
∆ =

2   =0
¢
.
The Envelope Theorem ensures that W
³










decreasing in  Therefore the value of the objective function is bounded below by the
value it would take for the upper bound of  (i.e.,  = 4
).

























a n dt h i si se q u a lt oW ¡
∆∗ =

2  ∗ =0
¢
 Therefore, we have shown that,
• For every  4










































• For every  4
 then the solution is  =0  and ∆ =

2 .








 A.7 Proof of Proposition 4.
As in the previous proposition, we need to distinguish two cases depending on whether
∆   or ∆ ≤  If we are in the case with ∆   then no physician works as
dual provider. In this case, trivially, the best contract is the optimal banning contract (as














0 if  ≥

2
We need to focus, therefore, on the case with ∆ ≤  The objective function of the






























subject to the constraints,  ≥ 0 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 







































≥ 0 ⇐⇒  ≤ 
W h e nc h e c k i n gt h es . o . c .w eh a v et h a t
2W
2  0 for
(
∗ =0 if  ≥ 
∗ =
−
 if  ≤ 
2W
∆2  0 for
(
∆∗ =0 if  ≤ 
∆∗ = 




It is easy to check that ∆∗ = 
(−) cannot be a solution, as the s.o.c only holds for
values of  such that ∆∗ = 
(−)  0. Thus, there does not exist a solution with ∆∗  0
and ∆ ≤ . The optimal contract, therefore, will be the one in Proposition 4.








 A.8 Proof of Lemmas 3 and 4.
They follow the same steps that the previous lemmas. ¥
A.9 Proof of Proposition 5.
We ﬁrst deﬁne each policy by a pair:
¡¯ Π¯ 
¢
and (¯ ¯ ) Each policy, in turn, will
determines a series of thresholds (as deﬁned in Lemmas 3 and 4) that characterize the
behavior of the physicians.
To do the proof, we show that for any possible earnings limitation, we can ﬁnd a
policy of limiting the involvement in private practice that is more eﬃcient (it provides
more health at the same costs).
Consider any policy of limiting private earnings (¯ ¯ ) This contract can give rise
to diﬀerent scenarios. Let us study them independently:
Non-binding Policy: (¯ Π ≥ ¯ ) Consider that the limit to earnings is so high that
it is not binding for any of the physicians that actually work for the public sector. In
other words, the ﬁrst physician that would be aﬀe c t e db yt h ep o l i c yi so n et h a ta l r e a d y
chooses to work solely in the private sector. In this case, as Lemma 4 states, the policy is
irrelevant. Thus, any policy of limiting the involvement in private practice with the same
salaries ¯  = ¯  a n dw i t ha¯  so high that is not binding for any physician (i.e., with
¯  ¯ ) is, by construction, as good as the original ¯ -policy.
Binding policy: (¯ Π  ¯ ) The limit is such that some physicians are unconstrained
dual providers, while others are aﬀected by the policy. Formally, following Lemma 4, this






















the physician chooses to work only in the private sector.
N o w ,l e tu ss h o wt h a tw ec a nﬁnd a new duple for the policy that limits the involvement
in private practice (¯ ¯ ) that is more eﬃcient.
Consider a policy that sets ¯  = ¯  =  and ¯  such that the physician that is indiﬀerent
between being a dual provider or leaving the public sector is the same under the two
policies. From Lemmas 3 and 4, this value of ¯  is such that
2 +¯  +
p
¯  (4 − 3¯ )
2
=
 + ¯ Π

⇐⇒ ¯  +
p
¯  (4 − 3¯ )=2¯ Π

In words, this means that the physician with ability  = +¯ Π
 (denote this threshold ˆ )















¯  (4 − 3¯ )
´







¯  (4 − 3¯ )
´
=2 2¯ Π
 (since we are in the region with ¯ Π
  ¯ ).
Done this way, both policies imply the same wages and the same number of physicians
working in each sector. Now, let us compare the amount of dual practice that dual
providers exert with each policy.













the physician chooses dual practice and ∗ ()=¯ 













the physician chooses dual practice and ∗ ()  
2





do an amount of dual practice ˆ  () such that
¯ Π
(ˆ  ()) =
¡




Note that we have constructed ¯  in such a way that ˆ  (ˆ )=¯  This, together with the





we have ˆ  (ˆ )  ¯ 
Finally, it is easy to check that, since ¯  is such that
2 +¯  +
p
¯  (4 − 3¯ )
2
=
 + ¯ Π

then ¯ ¯ Π W i t ht h i s ,w eh a v et h a tt h ea m o u n to fd u a lp r a c t i c ep e r f o r m e db yt h e
physicians under the two policies is:













  2¯ Π

´
¯  ∗ ()=






¯  ˆ  ()  ¯ 
 =ˆ  ¯  ˆ  ()=¯ 





less dual practice under the ¯ -policy than under the ¯ -policy.
Therefore, the ¯ -policy dominates as it implies paying the same wages, having the
same amount of physicians working in the public sector, but a lower amount of dual
practice, what causes a lower aggregate productivity loss.








 A.10 Proof of Proposition 6.
We focus on the case with ¯  ≤  and the policy is actually aﬀecting physician behavior.

























2 +¯  +
p




subject to the constraints that  ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ ¯  ≤ 
We make some manipulations on the objective function in order to work with a more
compact optimization program. This is done without loss of generality. First, we do a
change of variable and deﬁne  ≡
¯ 
 ∈ [01] where  =0corresponds to ¯  =0(banning






























We now force a common factor 1




























which shows that the solution to the program will be independent of the parameter  We
ﬁnally rename the combined parameter  as  and  as ˜  The optimization program


























s.t. ˜  ≥ 0 and  ∈ [01]
Note that this program is simpler (but equivalent) to the original one. The variable
that determines the intensity of the limiting policy, ,i sd e ﬁned over a compact set and,
moreover, there is only one parameter that is relevant for the optimization ()i n s t e a do f
three (  ) in the original program.
We will analyze, in turn, each of the cases regarding the constraints. First, it is
straightforward to dismiss ˜ ∗ =0as a candidate to solution, since the objective function
would take value zero. Secondly, corner cases  =0and  =1correspond to the ban








 be obtained directly from (3) and (1). The value of the objective function in each of the


























Finally, the optimal values for the interior solution  ∈ (01) and ˜ 0 are the solu-

































˜ (1 +  ˜ )2 + (2 +  +
p
(4 − 3)+4 2 ˜ )
2(1 + ˜ )2 =0 
For 
 =0  either the ﬁrst parenthesis of the numerator or the second one have to be
equal to zero. It is straightforward to see that the ﬁrst parenthesis is zero if and only if
 =1  which corresponds to the corner case analyzed above. Therefore, if  ∈ (01),t h e
solution to the optimization program (∗() and ˜ ∗())i ss u c ht h a t :


















˜ (1 +  ˜ )
2 + (2 +  +
p
(4 − 3)+4 
2 ˜ )=0  (10)
The complexity of the system prevents us from achieving an explicit algebraic solution.
However, a numerical solution, and its corresponding welfare (∗() ˜ ∗()) can be
easily computed for each value of .
What is left to do to complete the proof is to compare the welfare attained at the
interior solution with that at the two corner cases analyzed above. First, consider the
comparison between  =0and ∗ () Let us deﬁne for any value of  ∆W ≡ W=0 −
W( ˜ ). Consider now the particular case with  =0and ˜  =˜ ( =0 )=
2 Trivially,
∆W =0  We now show that it is possible to ﬁnd values of  ∈ (01) such that W=0 
W( 
2) This follows directly from the fact that ∆W
 |(=0 ˜ =
2) = −∞ This is suﬃcient
to ensure that W=0  W(∗() ˜ ∗()) and, therefore, that setting  =0is never a
solution.
Consider, ﬁnally, the comparison between  =1and ∗() Similarly as before, let
us deﬁne for any value of  ∆W ≡ W=1 − W(∗() ˜ ∗()).I t c a n b e s h o w n
that ∀0, ∆W is decreasing in  Moreover, ∆W =0if and only if  =2  i.e., if
 = 2
 Thus, for any  2
 ∆W  0 meaning that the interior solution (∗() ˜ ∗())
provides higher welfare than the corner one with  =1(laissez-faire). Conversely, for
 2





provides the highest welfare.








 A.11 Proof of Proposition 7.
We focus on the case with ¯  ≤  and the policy is actually aﬀecting physician behavior.

























2 +¯  +
p




subject to the constraints that  ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ ¯  ≤ 
Again, and without loss of generality, we make some manipulations on the objective
function in order to work with a more compact optimization program. First, we do a
change of variable and deﬁne  ≡
¯ 
 ∈ [01] where  =0corresponds to ¯  =0(banning






































































We ﬁnally deﬁne  ≡ 






























 This program is simpler (but equivalent) to the original one. The variable that determines
the intensity of the limiting policy, ,i sd e ﬁned now over a compact set and, moreover,
t h e r ei so n l yo n ep a r a m e t e rt h a ti sr e l e v a n tf o rt h eo p t i m i z a t i o n( )i n s t e a do ff o u r(  
 ) in the original program. Note that we only consider cases with  (see footnote
16), what restricts the space of  to  ∈ (01)
We analyze, in turn, each of the cases regarding the constraints. First, it is straight-
forward to dismiss ˜ ∗ =0as a candidate to solution, since the objective function would
take value zero. Secondly, corner cases  =0and  =1correspond to the ban and
laissez-faire scenarios analyzed in Proposition 2. Thus, the optimal values of ˜  can be
obtained directly from (7) and (5). The value of the objective function in each of the two
cases, adapted from (8) and (6), is
W






























Finally, the optimal values for the interior solution  ∈ (01) and ˜ 0 are the solu-



















(4 − 3) − 2 ˜ (4 ˜  − 5) + 2(4 ˜  − 1)
i






























 =0  either the parenthesis
³




or the term in brackets
have to be equal to zero. It is straightforward to see that the parenthesis is zero if and only
if  =1  which corresponds to the corner case analyzed above. Therefore, if  ∈ (01),
the solution to the optimization program (∗() and ˜ ∗()) is such that:
−4 − 2
p







































 First of all we can see that there does not always exist an interior solution. In par-
ticular, it is easy to check that for  =0equation (12) does not hold as it is always
positive. Similarly, for  =1equation (12) does not hold as it is always negative. Thus,
by continuity, we can ensure that for very high ( → 1)a n dv e r yl o w(  → 0)v a l u e so f
 there is no interior solution. For such extreme values of  the solution will be therefore
either the one with  =0or  =1 .
The complexity of the system prevents us from fully characterizing the interior so-
lution, but we can easily show that there exist intermediate values of  for which it
exists. To prove existence it suﬃces to take, for instance  =0 54 For this partic-
ular value the system formed by (11) and (12) yields ∗( =0 54) ' 0224517 and
˜ ∗( =0 54) ' 126873 What can be easily proven is that an increase in  will translate
in a decrease in ¯ . To show this point, note that  is the only parameter that aﬀects ∗
and ˜ ∗ This allows us to show that for the interior solution an increase in  (which does
not aﬀect ) will not aﬀect the solution of the problem. This, in turns, implies that 
will decrease (to keep ˜ ∗ invariant) and hence ¯  will decrease (to keep ∗ invariant).
To complete the proof it rests to compare the objective function evaluated at the
diﬀerent possible solutions. The comparison between  =0and  =1was done in
Proposition 2 and hence the results there directly apply. Therefore,





then W=0  W=1.
• If  ≤ 1
2 then, there exists a threshold ¯ 2  0 such that,
— If ¯ 2 then W=0  W=1.
— If ¯ 2 then W=0  W=1.
Finally, to show that it is possible to ﬁnd intermediate values of  for which an interior
solution with  ∈ (01) is optimal it suﬃces to consider again  =0 54 A direct computa-
tion shows that for this value of it holds that W=1
|=054  W (∗( =0 54) ˜ ∗( =0 54))
Since  =0 54  1
2 this ensures that W (∗( =0 54) ˜ ∗( =0 54))  W=1 
W=0 and, therefore, that ∗ ∈ (01) is optimal. This completes the proof. ¥
A.12 Proof of Proposition 8.
For developing countries the proof follows directly from combining Propositions 2, 4 and
7.
For developed countries, the proof that for  ≤ 2
 the best is not to regulate dual prac-
tice and that for  4
 the best policy is to impose a limit on the physician involvement








 Thus, it remains to show that for values of  ∈ [ 2
 4
] a policy of limits dominates
that with exclusive contracts.
From Proposition 3 we know that for  ∈ [ 2
 4
] the optimal exclusive contract is
given by ∆ =
−2
2 and  =
√
1+2−1
















−6 − 2+( )2 +2
√





Deﬁning  ≡  we can rewrite the welfare as:
W
∗ =
−6 − 2 +( )2 +2
√






Note that, as we are in the region with  ∈ [ 2
 4
] this function is only deﬁned for
 ∈ [24]
We compare now W∗ with the welfare obtained under the optimal policy for  ∈ [24]
as characterized in Proposition 6, given by W(∗() ˜ ∗()) with ∗() and ˜ ∗() being
the solution to the system (9) and (10).
For this purpose, let us deﬁne, for any value of  ˘ W ≡ W∗ − W(∗() ˜ ∗())
It can be shown that ∀ ∈ [24], ˘ W is decreasing in  Moreover, we ﬁnd that when  =
2, ˘ W =0  Therefore, for any  ∈ [24] i.e.,  ∈ [ 2
 4
] it holds that W(∗() ˜ ∗()) 
W∗. This completes the proof. ¥
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